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Abstract
We address the relation between two apparently distinct problems: The quest for a deeper under-
standing of the nature of consciousness and the search for time and space as emergent structures in
the quantum mechanical world. We also advance a toy-model proposal of emergence of time from
a timeless unus mundus quantum-like space by using Aharonov’s two state formalism of quantum
mechanics. We further speculate on these issues within a quantum cognitive perspective with par-
ticular interest in two recent papers on this emerging field of science. One (Aerts et al) entails (as
we argue) a panpsychist top-down approach to the problem of consciousness. The second paper
(Blutner et al) proposes a quantum cognitive model for Jung’s psychological type structure. We
discuss these concepts and their relation with our main thesis, that time is a measure of individu-
ality. One of our central motivations is to provide arguments that allows the mainstream physicist
to take seriously a panpsychist worldview, a position that has been openly forwarded by many
modern philosophers.
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I. TIME IN QUANTUM THEORY AS A MEASURE OF INDIVIDUALITY
According to Kant, space and time are a priori non-empirical representations and as
such, they underlie all human mental constructions in order to organize and apprehend the
sensorial data of physical reality [1]. One could make the case that Einstein’s relativity
theory undermined this notion. We know since the early twentieth century that the inner
workings of space and time can differ radically from the structure that our naive intuition
leads us to. The Minkowski structure of spacetime was far from obvious and was discovered
by studying carefully the discrepancy between the structure of electromagnetism (spawned
by a large body of empirical evidence) and the Newtonian concept of space and time [2], [3].
One could well say that Maxwell’s equations already contains in itself the Lorentz spacetime
structure and that Einstein and Minkowski were the first to fully understand this fact.
In the third decade of the twentieth century, the theory of a non-relativistic quantum
theory (NRQT) of particles was developed by names as Heisenberg, Schro¨dinger, Born,
Bohr, Jordan and Dirac [4]. This theory is non-relativistic in a serious way. Time and space
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are treated in radically distinct ways: Time is a one-dimensional parameter and space is
an observable, an Hermitian operator defined on an abstract infinite-dimensional quantum
space of state-vectors. Of course, it was immediately recognized by the founders of quantum
physics that it was imperative to extend the theory in order to make it compatible with
relativity. Yet, the route to this approach was not so clear in the beginning. For instance,
when Bohr was told that Dirac was working on a relativistic equation for the electron, he
was surprised because he thought that Klein and Gordon had already achieved this [5].
After a while, it was recognized that no single particle equation would do the trick.
The concept of a relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) was introduced in order to
describe elementary particles and their interactions. Particles were interpreted as elementary
excitations of these quantum fields. The position operators of NRQT were ”downgraded” to
a simple parameter along with time in Minkowski’s spacetime. And there were good reasons
for this. First, Dirac observed that the opposite move (upgrading time as an observable)
did not make much sense because then time and energy would both have semibounded by
below spectrum like position and momentum observables. But this clearly conflicts with
the stability of fermionic quantum systems as the hydrogen atom for instance. Yet, it
was precisely this lack of stability of classical models for atomic systems that was actually
one of the major driving forces behind the development of quantum mechanics in the first
place. A second physical argument, consistent with the first can be made. The concept of
a particle state with a well defined position does not make sense because of the intrinsic
lack of an operational implementation of the measurement of its position with arbitrary
precision. (This is only one instance of an ”operational-positivistic” argument that pervades
the entire history of quantum physics). For example, consider an electron interacting with
a classical electromagnetic (EM) field. In order to confine the electron inside a wave-packet
with a width ∆x smaller than its Compton length 1/me (in natural units) one needs to
set an EM field so strong that it would unavoidably create positrons and electron pairs
implying a many-body formalism with a varying number of particles [6]. This provides a
powerful reason for a quantum field description of particle interactions. Even nowadays, our
most refined theories of physical reality accepted by mainstream physics is based on this
construction. The standard model of elementary particles and even most attempts to go
beyond it (supersymmetry and string theories as primary examples) are one way or another
ultimately defined within this paradigm. Yet, there is something odd about this model. First,
3
this move of the role played by the position of quantum particles seems strange. Indeed,
compare it to how the non-relativistic limit of relativistic classical mechanics (classical as
non-quantum) is understood. In the latter, the passage from the relativistic regime to the
Newtonian one is straightforward. It can be derived easily for relative speeds that are small
compared to the speed of light. This ”structural transformation” of the position operator to
a simple parameter for relativistic quantum field theory is not sufficiently understood and
many definitions of a relativistic position operator have been sporadically proposed in the
literature [7]. A second and much more serious ”positivistic flavoured argument” can been
made. Consider a full RQFT explanation of particle interactions. For example, suppose (for
the sake of simplicity) that the world is comprised only by electrons, positrons and photons.
We have an electronic field and the ”photonic field” which mediate the interaction between
the electronic leptons. Given a state of the electronic/EM field all one can compute and
”ask experimentally” are things like ”For this particular event of spacetime, what is the
probability of finding a certain number of electrons, positrons or photons with such and
such momenta, spin, helicity, etc.?” The typical scattering experiment is one where there
is a global field state characterized by a given number of incoming particles far away with
well defined momenta, spin, etc. and outgoing particles (long after the interaction) again
with a well defined number of particles with given states. One then computes and measures
the transition probability. What is curious about this full-blown quantum field description
is that since the particles are only excitations of quantum fields, there is no room for any
individuality of a single particle. This is a well-known fact, but it seems that the full depth
of the fundamental consequences of this issue has not been pursued far enough. Take, for
instance, a simple non-relativistic quantum system as the hydrogen atom. In this case, one
has an electron quantum mechanically bound to a proton by its classical electric field. The
electron can be in this or that energy state with this or that spin. But we think of the
electron as being the same particle that happens to be in different possible states over time.
From the point of RQFT, this is a ”linguistic liberty”, so to speak. What really happens
(according to RQFT) is that the (classical) EM field in this case is not strong enough to
create more particles/excitations with appreciable probability, thus, the individuality of this
particular field excitation is emergent. This poses the following question: how do we measure
time operationally? The obvious answer is: with a clock. But a clock is nothing else but
a periodic phenomenon of some sort. For instance, the rotation of the Earth around its
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axis or its translational orbit around the sun were once considered excellent clocks. Today
we apply atomic clocks to GPS technology. A necessary condition in order to an arbitrary
system be considered a clock is that it must maintain its individuality. If an object now is
supposed to be a clock, one must be able to recognize this system as the same object in a
further moment. How is it then that we have a full-blown RQFT with a previously defined
spacetime? Einstein changed our understanding of spacetime when he thought carefully
about how one can operationally define the synchronization of clocks in a way compatible
with electromagnetism. It seems that what quantum mechanics is telling us about the nature
of spacetime is that its structure should be emergent in some strong ontological sense that
still remains to be unravelled. The structure of RQFT is a ”superstructure” in this sense.
Time and space are artificially included ”by hand” in the theory. For this reason it is
natural to claim that, in some sense to be made more precise in the future, one can state
that ”Time is a Measure of Individuality”. We address a few suggestions of how this may
be accomplished in the following sections. In the last section, we conclude with some closing
remarks. We visit now a concept that is possibly even more controversial than that of the
nature of time or spacetime.
II. TIME AND CONSCIOUSNESS: THE TRUE ”ASTONISHING HYPOTHE-
SIS”
Francis Crick, one of the 1962 Medicine nobel-prize winners for co-discovering the double-
helix structure of DNA (together with James Watson and Maurice Wilkins) published a
book in 1994 called ”The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul” [8].
In his book, he advocates a physicalist and reductionist explanation of the mind and other
attributes of consciousness. From the perspective of the History of Science, Newtonian
Physics was followed by an increasingly number of new developments over the past three
or four centuries together with amazing advances of the hard and biological sciences. It
would seem that one could conclude today that the reductionist point of view is completely
vindicated. From a mainstream scientific standard, all attempts of a vitalist philosophy
have been purged from science and as so, the reductionist hypothesis (sometimes called the
bottom-up approach) for explaining consciousness actually looks anything but astonishing.
It fact, it is the opposite approach, the hypothesis that the concept of consciousness is
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somehow a primitive ontological feature of reality is nowadays what deserves to be called
astonishing. If one looks at the history of science, though, a much more intertwined complex
intellectual zigzag between both metaphysical positions becomes evident. Some of the most
important founders of the age of reason were not so convinced themselves of this extreme
form of ”naive physicalism”. Descartes advanced his well-known dualistic approach, where
mind can affect matter, but not the contrary [9]. His point of view is now considered almost
universally unacceptable given our present knowledge of science. Neither did Newton believe
in a completely mechanical universe that obeys deterministic laws (that were essentially
discovered by himself.) As a matter of fact, he somehow was able to maintain a metaphysical
view with enough room to accommodate a God that could once in a while ”intervene” in
the workings of the great machine [10]. Leibniz argued in his ”Monadology” that there is
an inescapable ”explanatory gap” between the purely mechanistic explanation of the world
and the true functioning of the ”mind” [11]. Yet, many of Newton’s later followers become
much more ”Newtonian” than himself. Take Laplace’s famous words [12]:
”We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause
of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature
in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were
also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the
movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an
intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before
its eyes.”
Needless to reaffirm, this increasing hard-core belief in mechanism as an ultimate de-
scription of reality was supported by an extraordinary number of successful applications of
physics and mathematics to all kinds of natural phenomena. Yet, a reaction against this
prevailing attitude from the intellectual world did not have to wait much: already in the late
eighteenth century, a number of different schools of thought (much later collectively coined
as the Counter-Enlightment movement) advocated a more anti-rationalist worldview where
vitalist and organic ideas were welcomed as a cure for the excessive cold and mechanistic
metaphysics of the times. These ideas were closely related to German Romanticism and
many thinkers and artists (Goethe for instance) defended many anti-enlightment positions
[13]. We dwell into these historical upturns only to point out that the resurgence of panpsy-
chism and monist related philosophies in the last few decades are far from being something
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new in the history of science. In the twentieth century, many founders of quantum mechanics
also dived into some related concepts. Bohr, Schro¨dinger, von-Neumann, Wigner and Pauli
all considered the idea of consciousness (or significantly close ideas) playing a fundamental
role in quantum mechanics. Bohr introduced the philosophical concept of complementarity
in order to deal with apparently logical contradictions found in quantum descriptions as the
famous wave-particle duality. He believed that this concept could be extended to many other
fields far from quantum physics as the complementarity between science and religion, for ex-
ample. Bohr was also convinced that the so called measurement problem could be solved by
imposing that a state vector of a quantum system collapses when it interacts with a classical
measuring system. Thus, in his view, classical reality should have an ontological status equal
to quantum reality. But the circular logic implied by the fact that classical reality should
also obviously be some kind of classical limit of the quantum description of the world did
not seem to bother him at all. Bohr was also influenced by Taoist philosophy. Indeed, when
Frederick IX conferred him the Order of the Elephant, he designed his own coat of arms
which featured the yin/yang symbol together with the Latin motto contraria sunt comple-
menta, ”opposites are complementary” [14]. Schro¨dinger was pretty much influenced by the
philosophy of Schopenhauer and like him also had strong interests in Eastern philosophies.
In his book What Is Life? (curiously the book that decisively influenced Watson and Crick
in their pursuit of the structure of DNA) he speculates about the possibility that individual
consciousness could be a manifestation of some kind of universal consciousness [15], [16].
It is also well-known that both von-Neumann and Wigner suggested the introduction of a
conscious observer in order to solve the measurement problem in quantum mechanics [17].
Yet, it is fare to say that it was Pauli and his friend Jung that pushed these ideas to an
unprecedented level [18].
Jung was a Swiss psychiatrist who founded the discipline of analytical psychology. One
of its main concepts is that of individuation. a process of integrating the conscious realm
with the unconscious one in order to provide a healthy human development of the psyche.
He introduced a number of concepts like psychological types : the extrovert and introvert
attitudes together with the psychological functions of Sensation, Intuition, Thinking and
Feeling. He also developed the concept of archetypes, collective unconscious, the ego and
the shadow, the animus and the anima and synchronicity. This last concept involved the
idea of non-causal relations between events with psychological significance. This greatly
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influenced Pauli (that was his patient) and they become collaborators and friends. They
developed together the notion of the unus mundus in connection to non-local and non-causal
synchronistic phenomena. The unus mundus can be thought as a deep ”undifferentiated sea”
of unconscious possibilities where common elementary archetypes of the human race resides
and that occasionally surfaces through the particular individuation of human beings.
Jung developed these conceptual constructs after many years both of clinical observations
of his patients and personal introspection. Both thinkers believed that the objective world
and the subjective world were equally real and important and that a proper understanding
of the relation between these distinct ontological realms was a matter of great urgency. They
were convinced that physics (and science in general) would evolve towards this path in the
future.
These indeed are extraordinary and truly astonishing claims. After all, the beginning
of modern science was shaped during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment when a clear
cut between objective and subjective reality was devised. How could it even be possible to
consider going back to the superstitious, religious and ”magical thinking” of medieval times?
Today, most thinkers that consider panpsychism seriously are considered as anti-rationalists
by mainstream physicalists [19]. Probably a superficial ”new-agism” together with some
exaggerated post-modern relativism did not help much in this matter [20], [21]. The work
of Philosophers and Cognitive Scientists varying from Gregory Bateson to David Chalmers,
Liane Gabora and Ignazio Licata are, unfortunately, not sufficiently appreciated, in general,
by the current hard materialistic paradigm [22], [23], [24], [25].
We distinguish four main distinct philosophical positions on this issue. To make this point
clear, let us quote a famous line of Wittgenstein from his ”Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”:
”Whereof one cannot speak, thereof must one be silent.” [26] The first view is that of the pure
hard-core materialistic and physicalist thinker. He would interpret Wittgenstein’s words as
meaning that all there is about reality are precisely only those things that can be said about
it. This position represents such a naive view that it almost excuses us from further commen-
taries. It is enough to say that this represents precisely the opposite of what Wittgenstein
was trying to communicate [27]. This impoverished philosophical stand is commonly found
to be behind a certain kind of revived old-fashioned discourse coined pejoratively as ”sci-
entism”. Yet, many contemporary mainstream scientists go along with this metaphysical
position . The second view is probably much more akin to Wittgenstein’s original vision.
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This is the view of the mainstream scientist that does not negate the existence of things in
the world that are beyond science, but believes that since these matters belong (by definition)
out of the domain of scientific discourse, they should be dealt exclusively by non-scientific
disciplines like ethics, religion, etc. This is a respectable and pragmatic position and there
are good reasons for taking this metaphysical position seriously. A third view envisages a
philosophy of monism in order to describe reality where the nature of consciousness and
that of material reality are one and the same. This philosophy of panpsychism can be seen
as a top/bottom approach to the mind/body problem where consciousness is a primary on-
tological feature of the world and where any element of material reality has at least some
degree of consciousness [28]. Yet, there is a fourth view that can be considered as being
somewhat between views number two and number three. This stems from the fact that one
may formulate the following question (about view number two): if there is a clear division
between those things that we can speak about and those that we cannot, how can we talk
about the division itself? How can one recognize it? One possible answer is that we talk
about the ”unspeakable” indirectly through metaphors, art, religion and cultural expressions
in general. But, the cultural forms and language that we use in order to express science (and
in particular, physics) also evolves in time. As an example, take Faraday’s concept of force
fields that he introduced in the nineteenth century. This represented a major step away
from the local particle interaction model of Newtonian mechanics. It was difficult for the
physicists to understand this new form of thinking. It was Hertz that finally accepted the
fact that Maxwell equations were the EM theory, paving the way for Einstein. All the other
main physicists of the day (including Maxwell himself) tried to construct mechanical models
for a luminiferous ether. Today any child is familiar with the idea of a ”force field”. It is
commonly depicted in many contemporary cartoons, TV shows and science-fiction movies.
Who knows what people will think about wave-functions and quantum entanglement in a
couple of hundred years from now? Richard Feynman in his famous Lectures on Physics that
he delivered back in the sixties to undergraduate students at Caltech has a section named
”Scientific imagination”. Some excerpts from the original text are quoted below [29]:
”...I have no picture of this electromagnetic field that is in any sense accurate. ...When
I start describing the magnetic field moving through space, I speak of the ~E and ~B fields
and wave my arms and you may imagine that I can see them. I’ll tell you what I see. I see
some kind of vague shadowy, wiggling lines—here and there is an ~E and ~B written on them
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somehow, and perhaps some of the lines have arrows on them—an arrow here or there which
disappears when I look too closely at it. When I talk about the fields swishing through space,
I have a terrible confusion between the symbols I use to describe the objects and the objects
themselves. ...We use a lot of tools, though. We use mathematical equations and rules, and
make a lot of pictures. What I realize now is that when I talk about the electromagnetic field
in space, I see some kind of a superposition of all of the diagrams which I’ve ever seen drawn
about them...
...Perhaps the only hope, you say, is to take a mathematical view...We are unfortunately
limited to abstractions, to using instruments to detect the field, to using mathematical symbols
to describe the field, etc. But nevertheless, in some sense the fields are real, because after
we are all finished fiddling around with mathematical equations—with or without making
pictures and drawings or trying to visualize the thing—we can still make the instruments
detect the signals from Mariner II and find out about galaxies a billion miles away, and so
on.”
Feynman gives us here a vivid and pedagogical example of how striking the influence of
historical and cultural contexts can exert upon scientific discourse.
It is our firm belief that there in no such thing as a completely neutral philosophical
thinker. Everyone carries their own prejudices and bias. At this point, the reader probably
has guessed that the author has sympathies towards views number three and four. Yet, it is
absolutely imperative to recognize that there is presently no hard scientific facts capable of
distinguishing any of these metaphysical positions. In fact, for view number two thinkers, it
is even impossible to distinguish them in principle. The view number one physicalist (clearly
also a kind of an extreme monistic and materialistic thinker) believes that the ”explanatory
gap” can be closed when the workings of the human brain become sufficiently understood
someday in the future.
We propose some concrete pathways where one can look for a intellectual construct that
can accommodate views three or four. Firstly it is important to acknowledge that there is a
large and ancient historical body of evidence of knowledge from the ”subjective realm”. This
may seem a contradiction in terms because we are used to think that only objective facts are
capable of being communicated and that deserves being recognized as science. Take physics
and mathematics as a typical example. The laws of Newton are the same in Europe or Asia
and relativity theory is the same in the Northern or Southern hemispheres. The famous
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number theorists Hardy and Ramanujan could work perfectly together on mathematics in
the early twentieth century, but the first was a typical European rationalist and the second
was a religious Hindu that believed that his uncanny mathematical skills were delivered
to him by his family goddess Mahalakshmi [30]. Yet, ”softer” sciences (as sociology and
psychology, for instance) are much more ”cultural dependent” than it is for ”hard sciences”.
Still, their disciplines are commonly considered as part of the scientific enterprise in general.
We put forward the idea of looking more carefully to what is called ”perennial philosophy”,
a term introduced by Agostino Steuco and later by Leibniz. Modernly, this concept was
recovered by names as Jung, Joseph Campbell and Aldoux Huxley [31], [32].
Perennial philosophy can be thought as a tradition which states that the psychological
structure of consciousness (different states of consciousness and in particular, mystical expe-
riences) stem from a universal concept. Yet, these ideas take different configurations based
on distinct historical and cultural contexts, thus shaping a variety of schools of thought and
organized religions in all places and times of mankind history. We assume that the concept
of consciousness and states of consciousness (as a working hypothesis) are real in the sense
that they have equal ontological status as mainstream scientific concepts like time, space,
energy, matter, etc. The evidence that allows us to pursue this approach results from a vast
and long time literature based on introspection and exploration of subjective experiences
both in Eastern and Western philosophies. Yet, there is only on true test that can prove if
this or any other scientific working hypothesis is worthwhile. This is the ultimate pragmatic
test where the fruitfulness of an idea is measured by the number of facts it can explain and
practical usefulness it can provide. It should also be consistent with the body of science
that we already know. There is one particular characteristic of these altered states of con-
sciousness that we are specially interested in. This is the phenomenon that is sometimes
called ”mindfulness” obtained through meditation and mind-altering substances. There is
a long tradition of statements that converge to a few ideas about these states: a feeling of
a ”loss of ego” and an altered sense of the flux of time. There seems to be a continuous
spectrum of states between our ordinary state of consciousness related to a usual sense of
psychological time and a complete loss of ego together with a feeling of ”timelessness” for
extreme states of consciousness. For example, a somewhat ”lighter” change of the ordinary
state of consciousness is the so-called ”day-dreaming”. This is a common experience that
usually occurs spontaneously followed by a sense of a lack of passage of time and immediate
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memory [33]. The chain of thought processes that happens continuously for all of us when
we are in our ordinary state of consciousness basically ”defines” our sense of an ”ego” and
even a mild interruption of this process changes our sense of individuality and our sense of
a passage or flux of psychological time. The striking parallel with our analysis of physical
time in the previous section is obvious. Hence, we may rephrase that somehow ”time is a
measure of individuality”. In the next section we deliver a more concrete face to this idea by
studying a quantum mechanical ”toy model” that may help shed some light on this issue.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF TIME
A. The Partial Trace and the Emergence of Temperature
Feynman discusses in his text-book on Statistical Mechanics [34] a concept that is known
as the improper density matrix. Suppose one is interested in studying a certain physical
quantum system defined by a finite dimensional space of state-vectorsWS. (We consider only
finite dimensional spaces in order to avoid inessential analytical technical details). Feynman
then introduces the ”rest of the universe” described by WR so that the ”whole universe”
is described by the tensor product W = WS ⊗WR. Suppose further that an observer has
physical access only to systemWS, then given a pure state-vector |Ψ〉 ∈ W of the ”universe”,
one can define a unique operator ρˆ|Ψ〉 that acts upon WS defined by the following equation:
〈Ψ| Oˆ ⊗ Iˆ |Ψ〉 = tr
(
ρˆ|Ψ〉Oˆ
)
for every observable Oˆ of WS. This operational definition singles out a map between the
space of rays defined by W and the space of positive unit trace operators in WS. One
recognizes this map as the well-known partial trace operation
|Ψ〉 〈Ψ| −→ ρˆ|Ψ〉 = trR (|Ψ〉 〈Ψ|)
commonly used in modern quantum information theory. Feynman, of course, was not mean-
ing anything ”cosmological” with his choice of words. He meant simply that given a partic-
ular physical system that we are interested in, say a gas confined by a piston in a cylinder,
the ”rest of the universe” could be any amount of the environment relevant to the physics
of the system. (A heat bath, for instance). In order to characterize the system to be in
thermal equilibrium, it is natural to suppose that the density matrix must commute with the
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Hamiltonian Hˆ of the system, so that the density matrix is a function of the Hamiltonian
ρˆ = ρˆ(Hˆ). We further assume that the entropy S = −tr(ρˆ ln ρˆ) is maximized together with
the further constraint defined by the internal energy E = tr
(
ρˆHˆ
)
. This leads us to the
well-known Boltzmann-like density operator
ρˆ =
1
Z
e−βHˆ with Z = tr(e−βHˆ)
where β is thermodynamically identified with the inverse temperature (in natural units). The
Hermitian operator e−βHˆ looks similar to the unitary time evolution operator Uˆ(t) = e−itHˆ if
one makes the identification β → it. This formal analogy allows thermal averages of systems
in equilibrium to be computed from RQFT with imaginary time. If a solution to the latter
is analytic in time, a thermodynamic solution can be obtained by Wick rotation. Thus it
is a mainly a mathematical technique for calculating thermodynamic partition functions.
Speculations that there may be some deeper foundational reason for these results have been
made in the literature but there is not yet any hard evidence for these claims [35]. Yet, we
may speculate about the possibility of ”deriving a emergent notion of time” in an analogous
manner. At a first glance, it seems difficult to find a way to somehow derive an unitary time
evolution operator instead of the Hermitian Boltzmann operator. In the following subsection
we suggest how to circumvent this problem.
B. Aharonov’s Two-State Formalism
The Two-Time formalism for Quantum Mechanics developed by Aharonov, Bergman and
Lebowtiz (ABL) in 1964 [36] was initially proposed in order to remove the apparent time
asymmetry from the usual formulation of Quantum Physics due to the projection postulate.
This formulation advocates that in order to provide a complete information for a given
quantum state of a system one needs to know not only the previous pre-selected state of
the system obtained by a strong measurement but also a post-selected state given also by a
strong measurement. This is a time-symmetric refinement of the ensemble given only by a
given pre-selected state. This concept led in the eighties to the discovery of a new element
of reality, the so-called Weak Value (WV) of an observable for a particular two-time state
[37]. Given non-orthogonal pre and post selected states |α〉 and |β〉 (the two-time state is
usually represented by the tensor product 〈β| ⊗ |α〉) then the WV
〈
Oˆ
〉
w
of an observable
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Oˆ is the complex number 〈
Oˆ
〉
w
=
〈β| Oˆ |α〉
〈β|α〉
It can be shown that the WV can be effectively measured by conducting a great number
of experiments with the same chosen two-time boundary conditions. This can be achieved
through an infinitesimally small coupling of the system of interest with a measuring system
within a von-Neumann pre-measurement setup.
This concept is indeed time-symmetric and the temporal inversion operation can be imple-
mented by swapping the pre and post-selected states together with the complex conjugation
of the WV. Consider now the following operationally definition: take two distinct maximally
entangled states |α〉, |β〉 of the ”whole ”universe” W = Ws ⊗WR analogously as discussed
in the previous subsection. In this case both ρˆ|α〉 and ρˆ|β〉 have maximum von-Neumann
entropy S = −tr (ρˆ|α〉 ln ρˆ|α〉
)
= −tr (ρˆ|β〉 ln ρˆ|β〉
)
= lnN , where N = min(dimWs, dimWR).
One can then prove that the partial trace of |α〉 〈β| (up to the proportionality constant N)
is an unitary operator Uˆ〈β|⊗|α〉: (proof in appendix).
Uˆ〈β|⊗|α〉 = NtrR (|α〉 〈β|) with Uˆ †〈β|⊗|α〉 = Uˆ〈α|⊗|β〉
Is is tempting to identify somehow the ”whole Universe W =Ws⊗WR” in this case with
the timeless unus mundus of Jung and Pauli.
IV. QUANTUM COGNITION
The emerging field of quantum cognition advocates the use of a mathematical formalism
inspired by quantum mechanics in order to model certain human cognitive structures and
other complex phenomena. Most researchers of quantum cognitive sciences are rather prag-
matic and careful about the world view behind their practice [38], [39], [40]. They make
it clear that they do not assume that the human brain is quantum-like as claimed by a
few scientists [41]. Their starting point is the assumption that some systems (as certain
human cognitive and psychological features) have such a degree of complexity, that it is
impossible to study its behavior without taking into account contextuality in the form of
non-Kolmogorovian probability models like the one provided by quantum physics. Many ap-
plications have been pursued successfully for subjects as decision theory and human judge-
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ment in general, conceptual composition, linguistics and memory recognition. Recently,
Dieterik Aerts, after a thorough investigation on how concepts can compose and interfere
with each other in a ”quantum-like” manner, advanced an intriguing proposition that con-
trasts strikingly from the prevailing view [42]. He set forward the position that quantum
entities may actually be nothing else than ”conceptual entities” themselves. One argument
for this is the striking parallel between the non-local, non-causal quantum channel of two
entangled quantum systems and the idea of ”meaning” of the composition of two distinct
concepts. He further theorizes that space (or spacetime) is a macroscopic emergent struc-
ture and the so-called non-locality of entangled elementary particles are a consequence of
the fact that they somehow ”exist beyond space and time”. This view resonates obviously
with some of the ideas that we discussed in previous sections. Aerts also discusses two
widely different metaphysical interpretations of this worldview: The first (which he chooses
to call an ”antropomorphic” interpretation) views quantum entities and their interactions as
an extreme instance of conceptual entities interacting through ”meaningful communication”
embodied by other quantum entities (and their compositions) just as like humans communi-
cate concepts through ordinary language. A second interpretation that Aerts asserts to be
a somewhat less radical and less antropomorphic philosophical position is a semiotic version
of these ideas: here, the quantum entities are nothing but signs exchanged between macro-
scopic classical systems like the communication between living creatures and also between
inanimate objects as computer interfaces. Again, we believe that we have here the possi-
bility of an intermediate choice. If one considers the concept of consciousness as a primary
ontological feature of reality then the danger of an antropomorphic interpretation vanishes.
After all, human consciousness may be only one instance of the general phenomena of con-
sciousness. Thus, the human species does not need to play any special role in the nature of
reality.
Another interesting paper on quantum cognition is that of Blutner et al where a quantum-
like model is proposed for the structure of Jung’s psychological type theory. This is one of the
most important parts of Jung’s concept of the structure of the self [43], [44], [45]. The au-
thors consider a two-qubit structure where one of the qubits accommodate a two-dimensional
representation of the introversion/extroversion attitude. When a person faces an object from
the world, the introvert personality tends to direct his libido inwards (towards the images
that the object elicits in the subjective world) and the extrovert directs his libido towards
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the object. The second qubit models the four psychological functions (thinking, feeling) and
(sensing, intuition) as two mutually unbiased orthogonal bases. The first pair of opposite
functions assesses and judges information either logically or emotionally. The second pair
involves perception of information, either sensorially or intuitively. According to Jung, every
human being is born with a primary function which is independent of race, gender, social
class or any other cultural context. A secondary or auxiliary function necessarily has to be
sorted out from the other pair in order to ”support” the primary function. Clearly the third
and fourth choices of psychological functions are then uniquely determined. The third and
fourth functions must respectively be the opposites of the secondary and primary functions.
The ”upper” hemisphere of this Bloch sphere is related to the conscious realm while the
”lower” hemisphere represents the unconscious. It follows that the eight possible choices of
the psychological functions together with the two attitude types implies a total of sixteen
different psychological types. The structure of an individual personality type is therefore
described by a state vector belonging to a four-dimensional space given by the tensor prod-
uct of these two qubits. Blutner et al argue that the richer topology of the two-qubit model
is capable of a much more adequate and refined explanation of the results obtained from
some well-known methodologies for psychological tests designed to classify which Jungian
type a particular subject belongs to. Jung claims that the psychic dynamics of a human
being takes place through the exchange of libido (psychic energy) between the conscious and
unconscious realms. The primary and secondary functions belonging to the first realm and
the remaining ”inferior functions” related to the latter. A normal and healthy subject must
have a balanced and integrated relation between these distinct structures and the role of the
analyst is to bring back this balance and develop their integration through the process of in-
dividuation. One cannot achieve this directly from the superior function to the inferior one.
It must always be intermediated through the secondary function. Thus, the path is from the
superior to the secondary function and from there to its opposite. This is the first phase of
an individuation which may be conducted with the help of an analyst. Yet, a full integration
of the superior and inferior functions and therefore the integration of unconscious elements
with the conscious is a personal life-time task. Jung also speaks of a further classification
of the psychological functions depending on rather they are or not of a fundamentally static
or dynamic nature. These four ”kinds of realities” as he coined them are the static reality
that comes through sensation, the dynamic reality revealed by intuition, the static images
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provided by thinking and the dynamic images perceived by feeling. As an example, consider
the static images generated by thinking. These are the timeless Logos of Platonic idealized
world of perfect ideas. Yet, feeling has a superficial resemblance to the thinking process.
Let us consider some illustrative examples chosen by Jung himself. For instance, take the
concept of freedom. It can be a highly abstract and static concept but it also can convey a
strong (potentially dynamic) feeling. In a similar manner, consider the concept my country.
It clearly can also be taken either abstractly or emotionally. Another example is the abstract
idealized and static definition of God as the ”unchanging totality of all changing processes”
or rather imagine God as a powerful dynamic image identified with Eros. It may prove to be
worthwhile to design and implement some cognitive tests on concept composition like those
conducted by Aerts and others but also accounting somehow for the psychological type of
the subjects. Aerts also observed the complementarity of the opposing ideas of abstractness
versus concreteness in his analogy between quantum and conceptual entities. He asserts that
the level of ”abstractness” of a given concept is somewhat the measure of its generality. For
instance, the concept animal is more abstract than the concept dog which in turn is more
abstract than my dog. The concept mine in this last example was used to give a context to
the concept dog in the sense that it provides further restrictions for the examples of dogs
that can come to a subject’s mind. Aerts compares the opposition of the abstract/concrete
concept with the complementarity between position and momentum of quantum particles.
Indeed, the more concrete a concept is, the more ”individuality” the concept conveys. In
fact, the more restrictions (contexts) are imposed over it, the more the level of concreteness
of the given concept will increase. Plausibly this could always be carried on until the ulti-
mate level of concreteness is reached when ”every mind” should agree on its ”uniqueness”.
We have then an individual object.
How can this conception relate to Jung’s type theory? It is important to recognize here
that the quantum-like modeling of conceptual space by Aerts and collaborators entails an
impersonal view of the ”collection of human minds” that deals with these concepts. On
the other hand, Jung’s psychological type theory seeks the means to understand specific
subjects, not only their ”minds” but the complete structure of a subject’s ”self”. There also
seems to be a kind of complementarity between these two approaches. Indeed, one approach
studies the space of concepts determined by the ”general mind set” of human beings. The
other focuses on the specific ways the psychic structure of an individual person perceives
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and accesses concepts and images that are caused by external objects. From a naive point of
view, one may think that the decision to study both processes within the same mathematical
structure would be a methodological mistake. But the beauty of this conception is the fact
that this allows one to describe within this same quantum-like structure both ”the things
that are thought” together with ”those things that think them up”. This should be expected
when one realizes that this division must be (in a certain sense) an arbitrary splitting of the
timeless unus mundus between an observed world and the world that observes it.
Jung firmly believed that causality alone is not sufficient to describe the full phenomena
of the psychology of the self. He asserted that the psychic structure of the self is a self-
regulating system with purposiveness. We wonder if there is a chance that this teleological
characteristic may be related to the two-state boundary formulation of the unus mundus.
V. CLOSING REMARKS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
We have tried to put forward some thoughts and speculations on how one could ap-
proach a unified and scientific panpsychist approach to the problem of consciousness and
the emergence of time (and spacetime).
For this goal, we have discussed some attributes from the emerging field of quantum
cognition combined with the world view of analytical psychology developed by Carl Jung
(and to an extent Wolfgang Pauli).
Recent work of Aerts, Blutner and collaborators are fundamental to this proposed pro-
gram. It is clear to our mind that the burden of scientific proof lies on the side of those that
advocate the panpsychist view and we hope that the ideas presented here may somehow
help to reach this objective.
A possible future program is the search for a model of the dynamics of the ”structure of
the self” discovered by Jung. The physicist’s approach to model the dynamics of a quantum
system is to discover a time evolution rule (to find a Hamiltonian) either empirically or
stemming from some more fundamental theory. It is our opinion that, in the case of the
structure of the self, it would be constructive to realize that one should rather seek for a
model with the notion of an emerging time (or psychological time) as we have discussed.
Presumably this should be accomplished together with the ”individuation” of a partic-
ular subject starting from an undifferentiated unus mundus identified with the collective
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unconsciousness. One can also envisage an empirical path towards this goal. The testing
of a psychological sense of time of subjects under some mind-altered states of conscious-
ness could be interesting. Consider, for instance, how two persons usually communicate
by conversation. This only occurs because they share a common language and vocabu-
lary. Communication often becomes easier when these persons know each other and have
developed a sharper set of common words and cultural expressions as jargon, slangs, etc.
It is a familiar feeling that sometimes in a close relationship one almost can ”guess” the
others words or thoughts. It is fair to say that in these cases one could state that there is
almost an ”extension of the ego” of each one of the subjects in prejudice to each other’s
individual ego-centered conscious. After all, a person’s ego is whatever this person identifies
itself with. It can be his body, his job, an ideal, his family, his country, etc. The ego con-
struct is continuously changing and it can even be determined by the actual momentarily
relationship with another person like talking to a friend, for instance. Suppose these two
friendly subjects are submitted to a test where they are both initially under the influence
of an extreme altered state of conscious. Plausibly at the beginning moments there will not
occur any conscious communication between them since each one will be deeply immersed
into their own personal unconscious and even their shared collective unconscious together
with a great decrease of an ordinary sense of flux of time. Gradually, one expects that
some sparse attempts of conscious communication will happen and the frequency of these
ephemeral attempts probably would slowly increase under the initially mild conscious-will
of each subject together with the withering effects of their mind-altered states. An impartial
noninvasive and thorough observation of this process may provide an important insight of
the inner functioning of some plausible kind of ”shared individuation” of the two subjects.
The struggle to communicate and the gradual increase of common words and concepts may
slowly allow the construction of some kind of ”clock ritual” between them. One expects that
this progressively feeling of individualization should be accompanied with a conjoint percep-
tion of a psychological time. Many other ingenious cognitive experiments may be devised in
order to study time perception under altered states of consciousness and the loss and gain
of individuality. Multiple cognitive time scales of the functioning of the brain have been
proposed as an interplay between quantum-like and classical random electrodynamic signals
from neurons [46], [47]. Also, some experiments have already been conducted to study the
bistability of perception under ambiguity [48]. This maybe a particularly interesting venue
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of investigation with regard to Jung’s psychodyamics of mental pathologies because it is
well-known that one of the characteristics of neurotic behavior is the incapability to deal
with ambiguity [33].
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VII. APPENDIX
Given two distinct maximally entangled states |α〉, |β〉 of Ws ⊗ WR, we may suppose
without loss of generality that dimWs = N < dimWR = M so that we can expand these
states as
|α〉 = 1√
N
∑
i
|ui〉 ⊗ |wi〉 and |β〉 = 1√
N
∑
j
|vj〉 ⊗ |tj〉
where {|ui〉 , |vσ〉} and {|wi〉 , |tσ〉} (i = 0, ..., N − 1 and σ = 0, ...,M − 1) are pairs of
orthonormal basis respectively in Ws and WR. We have then that:
|α〉 〈β| = 1
N
∑
i,j
|ui〉
〈
vj
∣∣⊗ |wi〉
〈
tj
∣∣
the partial trace gives us then
Uˆ〈β|⊗|α〉 =
∑
i,j
|ui〉
〈
tj
∣∣wi〉
〈
vj
∣∣ and Uˆ〈α|⊗|β〉 =
∑
k,l
|vk〉
〈
wl
∣∣ tk〉
〈
ul
∣∣
then an easy computation proves indeed that
Uˆ〈β|⊗|α〉Uˆ〈α|⊗|β〉 = Iˆ with tr
(
Uˆ〈β|⊗|α〉
)
= N 〈β|α〉
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